The Non-Chalcedonian Heresy: A Contribution to the Dialogue Concerning the
"Orthodoxy" of the Non-Chalcedonians (Continued from issue No. 6, 1996)
III. Dogmatic Differences
A. Is Severus Orthodox?
In its Third Joint Declaration (1993), the Joint Commission for Theological Dialogue proposed the lifting of anathemas which had been imposed in the past on persons or synods, if it should be recognized that these persons or synods were Orthodox in their teaching. Correspondingly, there are certain publications, older and recent, which present as legitimate the acknowledgment that the Christology of Severus is Orthodox. We believe that this acknowledgment does not hold water because Severus was condemned synodally. In our report, we touch on certain points of his Christology, compare them to the teaching of the Holy Fathers, and arrive at conclusions from which it is evident that Severus and his teaching were rightly condemned.
As sources for the teaching of Severus, we have used the studies of the Non-Chalcedonian professor V.C. Samuel. One of the enumerations of the dogmatic differences between Severus and Saint John of Damascus made by Samuel will comprise the introductory text. He writes:
1. The Chalcedonian theologian accepts all the Alexandrian expressions included under 'one incarnate nature of God the Word.' In so doing the Damascene understands the term 'nature' in the sense of 'essence.' But Severus insists that this sense does not safeguard the historical reality of Jesus Christ, and that if we are to safeguard it, we must confess the hypostatic character of the natures which came into union.
2. John of Damascus does not say clearly what he means by the expression 'composite Person,' or 'composite Hypostasis,' although he accepts it. Severus uses the phrase and clarifies its meaning. The one Hypostasis, he says, was formed the concurrence of the Divinity and the humanity of Christ. In the union, the humanity has been individuated, and for this reason it preserves its hypostatic character, as well as the potential for the human expression of the Divine energies and attributes, so that it can be grasped by us.
3. Severus does not believe that in order for the true humanity in Christ to be preserved there is any need for expressions like 'in two natures,' 'two wills,' 'two energies' and similar expressions. According to his perspective, these expressions introduce division of the one Christ, and cannot guarantee a true incarnation.
5. The insistence of John of Damascus on the deification of the humanity of Christ is connected with his refusal to accept the hypostatic character of the humanity of Christ. Severus, on the other hand, is unyielding on this point?
If we have correctly understood Professor Samuel, it seems that Severus attempts to understand the mystery of the Incarnation by using the philosophy of Aristotle as a tool. For this reason, as it appears from the texts of Samuel and from the above extract: Severus distinguishes between essence and nature, equates nature with hypostasis, understands the hypostatic union differently from the Holy Fathers, distinguishes between hypostasis and person, ascribes will and energy to the person and not to the nature, and finally, does not have an Orthodox understanding of how the assumed humanity of Christ is Deified. We shall proceed to analyze the points on which Severus is not in accord with the Fathers.
1. The Theology of Severus is Aristotelian.
Severus is not the first to use the terminology of his period with the content that Aristotelian philosophy gives to it. Arius and the other heretics did exactly the same thing in their attempt to comprehend the mysterious rationally. The Holy Fathers used the same terminology, but gave it such content that it could express all that they knew from personal experience of God and as a result of being enlightened from on high. Saint John of Damascus writes on this point:
The pagan philosophers, according to the aforementioned discourse, said that essence and nature were different…. The Holy Fathers, passing over their many quarrels, called that which is common and said of many things, that is, the most specific kind, "essence," '"nature," and "form," such as angel, man, horse, dog and the like. They called that which is particular, "individual,'" "person," and "hypostasis," such as Peter and Paul.
And Saint Maximus the Confessor wholly equates the terms "essence" and "nature'" (Patrologia Græca, Vol. XCI, Col. 149B) and the terms "hypostasis" and "person" (Patrologia Græca, Vol. XCI, Col. 152A). Up to this day, the Non-Chalcedonians insist that in the domain of Theology — that is, the dogma of the Trinity — the Fathers made a distinction between "Nature" and "Hypostasis," whereas in the domain of Economy — that is, of Christological dogma — they equated the terms. This view, however, is not consonant with the opinion of the Holy Fathers. Saint Maximus sees wickedness in the new invention of the Non-Chalcedonians, while Saint John of Damascus asks why one should equate these terms in the domain of Economy. It has repeatedly been said that terminological ambiguity created the enormous difficulties in mutual understanding between the Orthodox and the Non-Chalcedonians in the centuries that followed the Fourth Ecumenical Synod. This is used today, especially, as a lever for the reunion of the separated bodies, in the sense that the confession is the same, even if the two sides could not understand each other in the past.
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We think that this is not correct. The Saints of the Church, who were of the same mind, formulated Christological dogma in an equally Orthodox way, even if with differing terms. Nor is terminological ambiguity even a decisive factor in determining the absence of orthodoxy. For example, Saint John Chrysostomos and Theodore of Mopsuestia were contemporaries and fellow-ascetics; but the one is a Father of the Church and the other is a great heresiarch. Another relevant example is that of Sts. Cyril of Alexandria and Leo of Rome, who formulated their Christological dogma in an equally authentic and an equally Orthodox manner, although they were combatting different heresies and were aiming at different goals: the former was aiming to safeguard the unity and uniqueness of the Person of Christ without really dividing the two natures in Christ, while the latter was aiming to ensure the reality of the two natures, without destroying the unity and uniqueness of the Person.
Consequently, we think that a decisive factor for Orthodoxy, or the lack thereof, was the deeper conception of the question, which the ever-memorable Father Georges Florovsky discusses. We have observed that in none of the texts of the Holy Fathers is there any mention of acquiescence to the heretics, inasmuch as they can perhaps claim terminological ambiguity as a mitigating factor in their lack of Orthodoxy. We cite the opinions of two Saints, which are characteristic of the style with which the Holy Fathers confront the issue of terminology. Saint John of Damascus:
Furthermore, Dioscorus and Severus and the multitudinous mobs of both accepted that there was one and the same hypostasis, defining in a similar way that there was one nature, 'not knowing what they say nor understanding what they assert.' The disease or deception in their mind lay in this, that they conceived nature and hypostasis to be the same.
Saint Maximus: "Severus knavishly says that hypostasis is the same as nature."
2. Severus accepts that the human nature of Christ subsists as a hypostasis.
As we have already said, Severus uses the terms "essence," "nature," "hypostasis" and "person" with the content given to them by Aristotelian philosophy. Severus does not conceive nature as concrete hypostases, but considers it generally as the essence of hypostases of the same kind; for him it is an abstract concept and does not really exist. When the essence is individuated in hypostases, the nature becomes concrete, takes on a hypostatic character, is made an individual and is actual. What we have said becomes clear in the extract below:
In the case of man, at the precise moment of concurrence between the essence of the body and the essence of the soul, he comes into existence as a psychosomatic totality and receives personhood, The two essences are not united as essences, but at the precise moment of union they become hypostatic realities. 'The body and the soul,' writes Severus, 'from which man formed, preserve their hypostases.' This point can be explained as follows. Hypostasis is the concrete subsistence Which derives from the individuation of an essence.
Severus transfers this example of man, a composite of body and soul, to Christ. In an analogous way, he writes, the Divine and human natures subsist in Christ. For the present we shall not dwell on the fact, fundamental in other respects, that the example of man cannot be transferred to Christ. Especially significant in this connection is the fact that according to Severus, the human nature of Christ participated in the union — although not before the moment of union — as hypostasis, and, in particular, having the elements which make it a person.
The Divinity and the humanity, then, combined into one. The moment that the Divinity came to union in God the Son, the humanity came to union in an individuated state. As Severus writes: "God the Logos is one hypostasis, He united to Himself hypostatically a particular flesh, which had a rational and spiritual soul and which He assumed from the Virgin Mary." The two natures, then, which came together in union were hypostases, although the Humanity of Christ received Its hypostatic condition only after the union.
The following extract explains a great deal:
In uniting humanity to Himself, does God the Word assume it only as an abstract reality, without it being in hypostatic or personal condition? If the humanity of Christ does not have the features which make it a person, can it function in any way in the Incarnation.
In juxtaposing the teaching of the [Orthodox] Church, we confirm its difference from that of Severus. It is taken for granted that nature understood "in mere thought" is something abstract. God the Word, according to Saint John of Damascus, assumed not the nature, understood in this way, nor that which is observed in the species, that is, all men together, but that which is observed in the individual, which is itself observed in the species, but which does not have a hypostatic character, but is observed as a whole in every hypostasis of the same species. The Saint, therefore, writes:
For the flesh of God the Word did not subsist in a self-existenting manner, nor did another hypostasis come into being besides the Hypostasis of God the Word, but rather, the flesh subsisted in it enhypostatically and did not become a self-existing hypostasis in itself."
And again, in another work of his:
It should be known that it is possible for natures to be united With each Other hypostatically, as in the case of man, and for a nature to be assumed by a hypostasis and to subsist in it, both of which are observed in the case of Christ, "but it is absolutely impossible for one composite nature to be formed from two natures or one hypostasis from two hypostases;" and again, it is impossible for things that subsist by themselves to have another source of subsistence.
Saint Maximus had clearly detected the possibility of ascribing a Nestorian understanding of the union of the natures to Severus: "If, again, he says that the union occurred from hypostases or persons, he is proven to be of like mind with Ebion, Paul of Samosata, and Nestorius...." It is natural for the Non-Chalcedonians not to accept the accusation of Nestorianism that Saint Maximus — and we, too, as a result — imputes to them, because their reference to a hypostatic character of human nature does not signify Nestorianism in their view, but the safeguarding of the reality of the nature. However, this insistence of theirs is of no avail, because a good intention is not sufficient for an Orthodox formulation of dogma, but only a correct attitude, correct presuppositions and clear formulation. How can one make a distinction between hypostasis and hypostasis, unless the one is called "hypostasis" and the other "person"? It is precisely on this point, however, that we find the other erroneous philosophical presupposition of the Non-Chalcedonians: the differentiation of hypostasis and person. Hence their confusion as to the mystery of the hypostatic union.
We consider it indispensable to make an observation that is relevant to the hypostatic character — according to Severus — of human nature. Father John Romanides raised this point at the unofficial meeting in Bristol, and has made Orthodox theologians sensitive to it at the meeting of the Inter-Orthodox Commission in Addis Ababa in 1971. Let us ask ourselves: Does this subject not perhaps fall into the set of the subjects that were not examined in detail, since a more appealing method was chosen at the ensuing official theological dialogue?
3. The hypostatic union according to Severus.
The term "hypostatic union" was used by Saint Cyril in the sense of a real union of the two natures in the one Hypostasis of God the Word. The Antiochians contested this term as being innovative and as not expressing the mystery of the union of the natures in Christ, and for this reason they missed the mark and found themselves in the domain of heresy. The hypostatic union, when understood in an Orthodox manner, is the kernel of Christological dogma and the weapon against all Christological heresy. In the writings of the Holy Fathers, there is a plethora of references to this fundamental principle of Christology. In the mystery of the union of the natures, the Hypostasis of God the Word has ontological priority. This Word was made incarnate by assuming flesh with a rational and spiritual soul and uniting it with His divinity, in such a way that this eternal Hypostasis of His became also the hypostasis of the assumed flesh. The enhypostatic character of the assumed flesh constitutes the most perfect dogmatic formulation of the mystery of union. The "function" of God the Word is not exhausted in the mere fact that He was united with the flesh, but in the fact that the Word Himself now eternally constitutes the Hypostasis and person of Christ, the Word Incarnate.
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